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1.  Summary 
 
 Water policy in the United States has been significantly influenced in recent years 
by a number of high profile conflicts, including conflicts relating to California’s Bay 
Delta, Florida’s Everglades, the management of the Colorado River system, the 
Columbia/Snake system, and the Klamath and Trinity River Basins.  For a variety of 
legal, institutional and financial reasons, the federal government has played a major role 
in all of these matters, typically in partnership with state and local stakeholders. 
 
 This paper provides a “lessons learned” perspective on the federal/state 
decisionmaking process in these major water policy disputes.  The paper briefly 
summarizes key issues involved in the disputes, identifies important drivers in each 
conflict and discusses the nature of the decisionmaking process, including the role of 
federal and state authorities, science, funding, and political support. 
 
 The paper then looks across these high-profile disputes and draws a number of 
conclusions regarding the ingredients for successful resolution of difficult water-related 
conflicts in which federal and state authorities have a significant role.  It concludes that 
success often depends upon a mix of a strong triggering event (often a galvanizing 
regulatory or environmental development such as the listing of an endangered species 
and/or a hard drought); significant public interest in the issue; personal attention by 
leaders that have the standing and wherewithal to deliver on promises; a close 
federal/state partnership; a heavy dose of science and money; and an opportunity for 
meaningful stakeholder involvement in shaping a solution.  Typically all of these 
requirements are needed to successfully solve large, difficult water conflicts, although the 
strong presence of one or two of the elements (e.g., personal leadership by high-ranking 
officials) can sometimes compensate for the absence of others (e.g., significant public 
interest in an issue).   Failure is almost assured when at least two of these elements are 
missing from major water conflicts.      
  
 
2. A Learning Laboratory: High-Profile Water Disputes 
 
 A number of high-profile water disputes have erupted over the past 10 years.  
Although many of the disputes are large and seemingly intractable, federal, state and 
local players have developed problem solving approaches that are bearing fruit in many 
of these matters.  The outlook is less optimistic in others.  In all cases, however, there are 
lessons to be learned. 
 
 The discussion that follows focuses on high-profile water disputes that have 
developed in five major watersheds, and which have provided a laboratory for all who are 
interested in solving complex, difficult water conflicts.  Cross-cutting conclusions and 





 A.  California’s Bay Delta  
 
The Bay Delta region, where the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers combine 
and flow into the San Francisco Bay, is historically one of the most environmentally 
productive and rich ecosystems in the nation.  Salmon traveled up Sacramento and San 
Joaquin tributaries and spawned in large numbers.  Freshwater fish also used the Bay 
Delta as their nursery, and the meandering river systems formed a large wetlands system 
that provided habitat for migratory and resident birds, and many other forms of wildlife. 
 
Beginning in the 1930s, water engineers took over and constructed the largest 
federal Reclamation Project in the west (involving the diversion of 7 million acre feet of 
water), followed by the construction of the companion State Water Project.  As a result of 
this feat of engineering, most of the major tributaries in the Sacramento/San Joaquin river 
systems were dammed, an extensive canal system was built, and large pumps were 
constructed on the south side of the delta so that water could be pumped through the delta 
and sent south to farms in the lower San Joaquin Valley and over the mountains into the 
Los Angeles Basin.  Overall, it is estimated that the federal Central Valley Project and the 
State Water Project together divert as much as 60 percent of the natural inflow into the 
San Francisco Bay to the San Joaquin Valley and to southern California.  Today, as a 
result of this infrastructure, 20 million Californians rely on the Delta as their primary 
water supply, and irrigated farms in the San Joaquin Valley are the most productive in the 
world.   
 
The engineering achievements in the Central Valley have come at significant 
environmental cost.  Habitat losses in the delta region have been severe as watercourses 
have been channelized, leading to significant losses of wetlands, and increased use of 
levees to protect (and isolate) remaining lands.  Water quality in the Delta has declined 
and fishery resources have been stressed as natural migration paths have been cut off, and 
large numbers of fish have become “lost” in artificial canals or entrained in large 
pumping stations.   
 
In the early 1990s, resources agencies began to take action to protect several 
species of fish that had recently been listed under the Endangered Species Act.  Delta 
pumps were closed down, leading to panic among water users.  Indeed, it was the triple 
whammy of new listings under the Endangered Species Act, a major drought, and the 
looming need to implement a new federal mandate to dedicate 800,000 acre feet of water 
from the federally-operated Central Valley Project environmental purposes (enacted as 
part of Central Valley Project Improvement Act of 1992), that forced a new dialogue 
among contending water interests – environmental, urban and agricultural.   
 
 Led by Secretary Babbitt and Governor Wilson, with a major assist from a 
concerned California business community, the warring factions entered into an interim 




peace, and kicked off a three year, comprehensive study of how to better manage water 
resources in the Bay Delta for the mutual benefit of water users and the environment.   
 
Federal and state authorization and appropriations followed, and money began to 
flow.  The ad hoc stakeholder group that was central to the success of the Bay Delta 
Accord was convened into a more formal governing body which had input on all aspects 
of the study effort.  This stakeholder effort was supported by a new federal/state 
organization, called CAL-FED, with its own staff (consisting primarily of staff on detail 
from 14 participating state and federal agencies), and its own offices and mission 
statement.  
 
The three year study period stretched to five as the CAL-FED process evaluated 
how to improve the environment, while also improving water reliability and water 
quality.  On the environmental restoration side, scores of dams were inventoried and 
evaluated; new wetlands opportunities were explored; and watershed improvements of all 
kinds were analyzed.  An innovative “environmental water account” was identified as a 
potential new tool that would enable the resource agencies (U.S. Fish & Wildlife Agency 
and California’s Department of Fish & Game) to dedicate water supplies to protect 
fisheries, when needed.   During the evaluation phase, funding for some of these 
activities began as 195 environmental restoration projects were approved, and more that 
$200 million dollars were earmarked for these efforts. 
 
 On the water user side, the CAL-FED study evaluated the increased use of 
modern water management tools, including water transfers, the use of groundwater 
aquifers for additional storage, and increased conservation and water reclamation and 
recycling.  In addition, potential new surface water storage and transmission facilities 
were evaluated, with the most promising new projects given priority attention.   
 
The study effort culminated in a $8 billion dollar programmatic plan that was 
endorsed by federal and state authorities, and all of the major stakeholders, in June, 2000.  
The final discussions were candid, and difficult.  In the end, Senator Diane Feinstein, 
Secretary Babbitt and Governor Davis sought accommodations that would keep everyone 
at the table, arms were twisted, and all major parties appeared together on the steps of the 
State Capitol in June, 2000.  A Record of Decision was issued in August, 2000. 
   
Two years later, the CAL-FED program is in trouble.  The strong impetus to 
finalize a long-term plan to accommodate environmental and water user needs has not 
translated into the  legislative arena; a multi-billion dollar authorization bill is stalled in 
Congress.  California is no longer speaking with one voice as some stakeholders are 
seeking to improve upon the deals that they made through the stakeholder process, 
putting strains on the delicate balance of interests that stands behind the Record of 
Decision.  And the high price tag for the program is raising eyebrows, particularly outside 





It remains to be seen whether the mutual dependency that characterizes the many 
interests involved in the California Bay Delta will hold the deal together.  While it seems 
unlikely that the CAL-FED architecture – developed over nearly a decade – will collapse, 
the future of the program is very uncertain, the latest reminder of the delicacy of high-
wire water deals. 
 
 
 B. The Everglades 
 
 The history of the Everglades water conflict bears a striking resemblance to 
California’s Bay Delta.  Like the Bay Delta, the feds had a major presence in South 
Florida, this time through the National Park Service (Everglades National Park;  Big 
Cypress National Preserve), the Fish & Wildlife Service refuge system and, most notably, 
the complex plumbing system that the Army Corps of Engineers had constructed, and 
continues to operate, throughout south Florida. 
 
 Like the Bay Delta, serious environmental issues triggered the need to take a fresh 
look at the Everglades.  Environmental degradation of the Everglades became obvious by 
the late 1980s and early 1990s.  The cumulative impact of the Corps’ management of 
water away from the Everglades was cause much of the legendary “sea of grass” to dry 
up.  By 1992, 90 percent of the wading birds had departed the Everglades, 68 species 
were listed as endangered or threatened, Biscayne Bay and Florida Bay fisheries were 
suffering, the top five feet of organic topsoil in the Everglades Agricultural Area had 
eroded, the inland and coastal water quality was degraded, invasive exotic plants had 
invaded 1.5 million acres, and wetlands and tree island habitats had disappeared. 
 
 Litigation also drew attention to the Everglades’ environmental problems.  The 
federal government sued the state of Florida in 1988, alleging that polluted agricultural 
runoff, including elevated phosphorus levels, was flowing onto Parks and Wildlife 
Refuge lands in violation of state water quality laws.  An apparent settlement of the 
federal/state lawsuit in 1991 led to the filing of 36 follow-up lawsuits filed by interested 
parties. 
 
 With the ecosystem on the ropes, and facing a litigation nightmare, the Clinton 
Administration stepped in, gathering all of the federal agencies together to work with the 
state, and with the South Florida Water Management District to address the water quality 
issues, and related restoration needs.  In 1993, Secretary Babbitt formed the South Florida 
Ecosystem Task Force to coordinate the efforts of the federal agencies involved in south 
Florida.  State authorities, led by Governor Chiles, became deeply involved, and helped 
to pass the state’s Everglades Forever Act in 1994, which created a billion dollar fund to 
help clean up contaminated agricultural runoff.  Congress then took up the cause, 
appropriating funds to develop a restoration plan and, in 1996, by formalizing the South 
Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force – a federal coordinating body that was 






 With state and federal funds in hand, the planning effort was underway in earnest 
while on-the-ground restoration activity began with important land acquisitions and the 
development of a multi-species conservation plan.  Finally, the study period and 
stakeholder processes matured into a thorough environmental analysis and the Corps’ 
development of a long-term, comprehensive restoration plan.   The plan is a bold, 
science-driven effort that calls for a fundamental modification of the south Florida’s 
water delivery system and the improvement of the quantity, quality, timing and 
distribution of water to natural systems, so that some of the water can be returned to its 
historic, southerly flow pattern through the Everglades, rather than bypassing the land 
and being shunted off directly into the ocean.   
 
 Despite a high price tag of approximately $8 billion dollars, the Everglades 
restoration plan is moving into the implementation stage.  Congress endorsed the plan 
and enacted it into law as part of the Water Resources Development Act of 2000. 
 
 
 C.  Colorado River 
 
The Colorado River is widely recognized as perhaps the west’s most important 
river system.  Although it is relatively modest in size (its flow is only one-tenth that of 
the Columbia River), its basin includes some of America’s most treasured landscapes, 
and it supplies vital water supplies to 30 million Americans.  By way of example, the 
Colorado River is a primary water source for Phoenix, Las Vegas, and the Los Angeles 
Basin (the Colorado supplies approximately one-third the water supply for 17 million 
residents in Southern California), and it supports a large irrigated agricultural economy 
throughout the Colorado River Basin. In addition, Hoover and Glen Canyon dams are 
two of the largest hydropower facilities in the nation, and a large recreational industry has 
grown up around Lake Powell and Lake Mead, as well as on the Colorado itself, through 
the Grand Canyon, and its tributaries (e.g., the Green River).   
 
The Colorado River Basin serves as a laboratory for many important water issues, 
including some significant conflicts.  Three are noteworthy in the context of this paper: 
 
Glen Canyon Dam/Grand Canyon.  When the Glen Canyon Dam first began to 
operate and generate hydropower, the flow regime adopted by the Bureau of Reclamation 
was developed to maximize electricity generation.  Unpredictable, scouring flows roared 
down the Grand Canyon and damaged the fragile beaches and riparian habitat that river 
enthusiasts enjoy on their trips down the river.   
 
The environmental damage caused by operation of the Glen Canyon Dam led to 
the initiation of one of the earliest multi-agency, interdisciplinary restoration study 




initiated in 1989 and, in 1992, Congress passed the Grand Canyon Protection Act, which 
required completion of the EIS process and the adoption of an “adaptive management” 
approach whereby the effects of dam operations on downstream resources would be 
monitored and assessed. 
 
A comprehensive EIS was subsequently developed with the involvement of water 
and power users, environmental and conservation groups, federal and state agencies, and 
Indian tribes.   The EIS was released in 1995 and a follow-up Record of Decision, signed 
in 1996, established the Glen Canyon Adaptive Management Work Group as a Federal 
Advisory Committee.   
 
The results of the effort have been impressive.  A considerable body of science 
has been developed regarding the impacts of various types of flow regimes on beaches 
and riparian habitat through the USGS Grand Canyon Monitoring and Research Center, 
established in 1995. The Adaptive Management Work Group is up and running, 
providing an opportunity for representatives from power interests, tribes, recreational and 
fishery interests, and federal and state officials to participate in science reviews, and to 
review operational plans for the Glen Canyon dam.   
 
Now, the Glen Canyon dam is operated with an eye toward protecting the 
ecosystem, in addition to producing hydropower.  And the process is dynamic, with 
scientific research continuing.  In 1996, for example, a major “spike” flow was released 
through the Grand Canyon, simulating a flood condition.  Downstream impacts were 
monitored carefully, providing feedback that will assist in making future operational 
decisions.  
 
Upper Colorado.  Listings of native fish under the Endangered Species Act in the 
upper Colorado River triggered significant controversy in the late 1980s as water project 
approvals were held up and local and state representatives expressed alarm about the 
ability of the region to develop its underutilized Colorado River water rights.  Political 
leaders acted quickly and entered into a Cooperative Agreement in 1988 among the 
federal government and the governors of Wyoming, Colorado, and Utah.  The Agreement 
established a Recovery Implementation Committee that has worked through management 
and technical committees to develop and implement fish recovery strategies in the Upper 
Colorado basin.  In return, the Fish & Wildlife Service provided blanket approvals for 
new water projects, within certain parameters. 
 
The Upper Colorado recovery program has now been in place for more than 10 
years, and many native species have been rebounding remarkably.  In 2000, with the full 
support of the affected Governors and the Administration, the Congress authorized an 
additional $46 million in funds for the program.  The environmental restoration success 
story continues  from all angles – science, stakeholder involvement, federal/state 





Lower Colorado.  The Lower Colorado River is more developed than the Upper 
Colorado.  With the completion of the Central Arizona Project in the mid-1990s, and the 
enormous growth of demand in Arizona, Nevada and California, the Lower Basin States 
(Arizona, Nevada and California) are now diverting their entire Colorado River water 
rights, adding stress to fishery and riparian resources along the river, limiting flows to 
Mexico and its biologically rich Delta region, and requiring the introduction of creative 
new water management tools to stretch limited water supplies. 
 
California’s oversubscription of Colorado River water has threatened to 
destabilize the water rights allocations that have been in place on the Colorado for 80 
years.  In this case, the federal government has a clear, obvious role insofar as the 
Secretary of Interior is the “water master” in the lower basin under the “law of the river.”  
As a practical matter, however, the Secretary must work closely with the seven basin 
stated in managing the river in light of the legal and political interests that all of the states 
have in management of the issues. 
 
The approach taken by Secretary Babbitt to defuse the growing crisis on the 
Colorado River was instructive.  Rather than force a top-down solution, he used his bully 
pulpit to deliver a series of annual messages to Colorado River water users to alert them 
to the seriousness of the issue, and to lobby California to develop a plan to reduce its take 
of Colorado River water.  When California made progress on a plan, but requested time 
to implement it, the Interior Department worked closely with representatives of the other 
states to manage Colorado River surpluses in a way that would enable California to phase 
in its water reduction efforts.  At the same time, Interior negotiated a precedent-setting 
arrangement that allowed the banking and transfer of Colorado River water among lower 
basin states, thereby providing Nevada with additional assurances that it would have 
adequate access to Colorado River water supplies in the future. 
 
Although the delicate negotiation of Colorado River management issues has 
differed from the Bay Delta and Everglades examples in many respects, the political 
sensitivity and leadership exercised by the federal government in pushing for change, in 
close consultation with affected parties, finds parallels in many other water conflicts.  As 
the plan moves forward, however, a serious environmental complication has arisen.  
Specifically, California’s Colorado River water reduction plan is based, in large part, on 
the conservation of a large block of Imperial Irrigation District water, and the transfer of 
much of that water to the San Diego County Water Authority.  As it turns out, water 
conservation and transfers from the Imperial Valley will negatively impact the Salton 
Sea, a resource that is being sustained because it receives water that flows off Imperial 
Valley fields.  A collision is brewing between the implementation of modern water 
management techniques needed for the vitality of the Colorado River Basin (conservation 






 D.  Columbia/Snake River Basin 
 
Salmon and hydropower provide the story line in the Columbia and Snake River 
basin.  They do not mix very well.  Many historic salmon runs in the basin have crashed.  
Hatcheries are churning out fish, but many of the wild populations are in serious trouble.   
 
Because the federal government is the primary operator of the river system (via 
the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA); the Corps of Engineers; the Bureau of 
Reclamation), and because the federal government has a trust responsibility to address 
the tribes’ treaty rights to fish, the feds have been a primary focal point of attention 
regarding salmon recovery efforts.  Based on input from the federal “action” agencies 
(e.g., the Corps; BPA; the Bureau of Reclamation), the federal resource agencies – the 
National Marine Fisheries Service and the Fish & Wildlife Service – are implementing an 
interim salmon recovery plan that relies heavily on a $400 million per year investment by 
BPA in salmon recovery efforts which includes a large barging program (under which 
smolts are transported around the dams in trucks and taken to the ocean), extensive 
scientific studies, and operational changes in flow regimes to assist the passage of fish.  
New turbine technologies also are being evaluated. 
 
A new, interim biological opinion was released late in 2000 which expanded the 
on-going study effort, and established benchmarks for recovery that may require, over 
time, more drastic action (e.g., potential removal of the lower Snake River dams) to 
protect endangered runs, depending upon the success of recovery efforts. 
   
Despite massive investments of capital, and a major science effort, the salmon 
recovery effort is only limping along.  Virtually no one is satisfied with the process or 
results of many years of effort and tens of millions of dollars in investments in the basin.  
Lawsuits have been filed on the latest biological opinion and on the legal status of wild 
versus hatchery fish under the Endangered Species Act, among other things.  Adequate 
funds to implement measures set forth in the biological opinion may not be forthcoming, 
leading to additional challenges. 
 
Why have salmon recovery efforts been so disappointing in the Columbia and 
Snake River Basins?  One reason may be the inability to develop a workable stakeholder 
group to build scientific and political support for a specific path.  A related issue may be 
the overwhelming federal presence in the basin, and the lack of a strong, countervailing 
set of state and local actors.  
 
That is not to say that stakeholder efforts have not been undertaken to address the 
salmon/water conflicts in the Columbia/Snake basin.  Indeed, the Basin is littered with 
unsuccessful efforts.  The Northwest Power Planning Council, acting under the authority 
of the Northwest Power Planning and Conservation Act of 1980, has done much good 
work in the area, but its lack of tribal representation is seen as a major liability.  Also, the 




Governors).  Because key decisionmaking authority is in the hands of federal resource 
agencies, the Council’s state-oriented tilt puts it at a disadvantage. 
 
The Columbia Basin tribes pushed for a “Three Sovereigns” approach that 
invested decisionmaking in federal, state and tribal leaders, but non-governmental 
stakeholders objected, and that proposal died a quiet death.  Finally, with decisions 
needing to be made, the feds retreated into a “federal caucus” where they have spent an 
enormous amount of time and effort in internal discussions, leaving little opportunity for 
outreach or the building of consensus. 
 
One bright spot in the region is in the upper Snake, where water interests in Idaho 
have been drawn into litigation with the Nez Perce tribe, and where concerns of a 
potential “water grab” for downstream salmon needs run high.  In that context of mutual 
concern, discussions are well along toward a resolution of competing demands for Snake 
River water in Idaho.  In contrast to the rest of the basin, where the sheer number of 
players, complexity of the issues, and absence of an effective forum has impeded 
progress, a settlement in Idaho appears possible. 
 
 
 E.  The Klamath and Trinity River Basins 
 
 The Klamath Basin in southern Oregon and northern California is the home of a 
large irrigation project developed by the Bureau of Reclamation and one of the first 
wildlife refuges (established by President Teddy Roosevelt).  It also is home to the 
Klamath Tribe, which has fishing rights in Klamath Lake and, downstream, to the Hoopa 
Tribe, which has fishing rights on the Klamath River.  Added to the mix are endangered 
species in the Lake and in the River, and a water-short, overappropriated Basin.   
 
Last year, the combustible mix of conflicting interests in the Klamath Basin 
exploded as the region was hit with drought.  There was not enough water to maintain 
lake levels needed for the resident endangered fish, to maintain stream levels needed for 
the endangered salmon, and to divert water to the irrigation unit and the wildlife refuge.  
Secretary Norton responded by cutting off water to the irrigators and the refuge, and all 
hell broke loose.   
 
 The upshot of the Klamath debacle remains to be seen.  Interesting and potentially 
precedent-setting actions taken by the Administration include the referral of the resource 
agencies’ biological opinions to the National Research Council, an arm of the National 
Academy of Sciences, which concluded that there was not enough science to dictate the 
lake levels and stream flows identified by FWS and NMFS.  (The NRC did not comment 
on the policy question of what FWS and NMFS should do when the science is unclear 
and in light of the agencies’ statutory responsibility to protect the species in question.)   
This year, the Administration did a complete about-face and is diverting all of the water 




obligation to supply water to its customers, and that any ESA-based water needs must be 
met through water purchases, or via some other means.  This action already has triggered 
additional litigation.   
 
 The confluence of the competing upstream and downstream water needs for 
different species under the ESA, the conflicting needs for water for farmers and for an 
adjacent National Wildlife Refuge, and tribal treaty rights, presents the same type of 
seemingly-intractable challenges faced in the Bay Delta and the Everglades.  Why, then, 
has the Klamath Basin problem exploded, while the other matters appear to be on a road 
toward success? 
 
 It is too early to draw many conclusions regarding the Klamath because the 
situation remains a work in progress.  Crisis usually has been a necessary prerequisite to 
serious engagement in problem-solving in the water world.  What comes next will be 
instructive.  Nonetheless, there were warnings that a Klamath melt-down might come; 
why wasn’t more incremental progress made before the severe drought appeared to 
remove all options? 
 
 Oregon State researchers have undertaken a comprehensive review of the 
Klamath situation that provides important insights into this question.  Their report notes 
that “the essential institutional quality of the Klamath River system is the fragmentation 
of interests and authorities without compensating relationship for the resolution of 
conflicts.”  It continues: 
 
The Klamath is an extreme case in this regard.  Although the third largest 
California river, it displays little of the institutional fabric that has developed for 
the Sacramento-San Joaquin or Eel-Russian systems.  It major tributary, the 
Trinity, has been managed primarily as an extension of the Central Valley system, 
subjected to a wholly different and external set of institutional and political 
dynamics that effectively isolate these hydrologically connected river systems.  
Although holding senior water rights, the tribes have been isolated from decision 
processes about the river.  The divisions of jurisdiction among Federal, Oregon, 
California, and tribal sovereignties are largely unresolved, or are perceived as 
resolved but in highly ambiguous and thus far unimplementable ways.  In 
particular, the extent of Federal deference to state water law, and the extent to 
which tribal rights depend on the relative balance of Federal to state power, are 
historical issues that do not, and perhaps may never, display resolution. 
 
 The Oregon State observations are on target.  The federal interests in the Basin 
are fragmented among the Bureau of Reclamation and their constituency (the farmers), 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs and their constituency (the tribes), and two different 
resource agencies from different departments, the Fish & Wildlife Service (Interior) and 
the National Marine Fisheries Service (Commerce).  Add to the mix the State of 




proceeding that has been in progress for many years, and an unimpressive track record in 
attracting financial or political support for water-related projects in the basin (some local 
political representatives have strongly resisted the Fish & Wildlife Service’s efforts to 
buy land and water rights on a willing buyer/willing seller basis;  the Bureau of 
Reclamation historically has had limited success in obtaining funding for water 
supplementation projects).  And many of the interested parties also are fragmented – 
geographically and otherwise.  Environmental, fishery, and some Tribal interests (e.g., 
the Hoopa Nation) are concentrated downstream, out of the central basin area.  The local 
area tribe (the Klamath) is in the upper basin, and largely isolated from the other actors.  
And neither the agricultural community nor the Refuge representatives have had a history 
of working with the other interested parties.  The state-sponsored water rights 
adjudication had begun to bring some of the parties together, but that forum was too 
limited in scope to push the parties toward a comprehensive solution that would address 
basin-wide issues.     
  
 The contrast between the Klamath experience and the management of water 
conflicts on its California tributary, the Trinity River, is instructive.   
 
 The Trinity River once was among California’s most prolific salmon streams.  In 
1955, however, Congress authorized the construction of Lewiston and Trinity Dams and 
associated structures to export water into the Central Valley of California.  From 1965-
97, approximately 74 percent of Trinity’s water above Lewiston was exported.  The 
remaining river was a shadow of its former self;  salmon stocks and other environmental 
indicators declined precipitously. 
 
In 1981, Secretary Andrus commissioned a study to evaluate how much water 
would need to be returned to the Trinity River to make the river productive again.  In 
1984, Congress passed the Trinity Restoration Act, which codified this commitment and 
budgeted funds for the study effort.  The Central Valley Project Improvement Act of 
1992 renewed the commitment, and established a stakeholder group to participate in the 
restoration study effort, including federal, state, and local officials, tribal representatives, 
water and power users, and commercial and sport fishery representatives.  
 
The USGS and Fish & Wildlife Service completed its study and an accompanying 
Environmental Impact Statement in 1999 and recommended that some of the diverted 
flows be returned to the Trinity.  The study did not call for a return of all diverted water.  
Instead, it modeled potential flows needed, working in combination with mechanical 
restoration efforts, that could help restore natural functions on the river.  Secretary 
Babbitt signed a Record of Decision in 2000, which adopted the new plan. 
 
The Trinity River decision was controversial, but it evolved out of a science-
based and stakeholder-heavy process that developed significant support for the decision 
throughout the Trinity River watershed.  Predictably, some water users in the Central 




Court judge has held up full implementation of the restoration plan pending additional 
study on impacts on power interests.)  While the litigation is pending, however, 
significant flows have been returned to the Trinity.   
 
The contrast could not be sharper between the long-term commitment to science 
and stakeholder involvement that characterized the Trinity restoration effort, and the 
absence of a participatory science effort, or a meaningful forum for the airing of 
conflicting interests, in the adjacent Klamath River.  When drought precipitated a crisis 
on the Klamath, there was no institutional place to turn for help, funding or problem-
solving.   
 
 
3.  Distilling Principles for Federal/State Conflict Resolution in Water Disputes 
 
 Studying experience gained over the past several years suggests what ingredients 
may be needed to resolve difficult water conflicts that involve significant federal 
interests.  As noted in the introduction, success often depends upon a mix of a strong 
triggering event (often a galvanizing regulatory or environmental development such as 
the listing of an endangered species and/or a hard drought); significant public interest in 
the issue; personal attention by leaders that have the standing and wherewithal to deliver 
on promises; a close federal/state partnership; a heavy dose of science and money; and an 
opportunity for meaningful stakeholder involvement in shaping a solution.  In my view, 
all of these requirements typically are needed to successfully solve large, difficult water 
conflicts, although the strong presence of one or two of the elements (e.g., personal 
leadership by high-ranking officials) can sometimes compensate for the absence of others 
(e.g., significant public interest in an issue).   Failure is almost assured when at least two 
of these elements are missing from major water conflicts.  
 
 
 A.  Strong Triggering Event 
 
  There are literally thousands of significant water disputes brewing in the United 
States, including a number of large and seemingly intractable conflicts.  The large 
majority of these water conflicts remain in the background;  they act like a low grade 
fever.  Occasionally, enough friction develops around the dispute that a trip to the 
“doctor” is warranted (a water court judge; a federal or state official; or the like), but 
neither the doctor nor the patient is prepared to risk major surgery.  Instead, small 
solutions are sought, around the edges – enough to keep the fever in check. 
 
 Typically, a strong triggering event is needed to convert a simmering water 
conflict into a major dispute that cannot be solved with over-the-counter medications.  
Nearly all of the case examples set forth above share this characteristic.  Often it is a 
regulatory action, such as the listing of a species under the Endangered Species Act with 




supplies, and/or a drought, which creates anxiety in the water user community, while also 
exacerbating environmental problems in the watershed.  Litigation frequently provides 
the spark that pushes a dispute over the edge. 
 
 Interestingly, nearly all of the triggering events in the conflicts reviewed above 
related directly to environmental issues.  In the Bay Delta, long-term environmental 
degradation issues led to the listing of anadromous and resident fish species.  In the 
Everglades, water quality issues associated with agricultural runoff, and magnified by a 
major piece of litigation, drew attention to broader environmental problems in the 
ecosystem.  Damage to the beaches in the Grand Canyon forced James Watt, the then-
Secretary of the Interior, to establish an early study of Glen Canyon Dam operations.  
Endangered species listings in the Upper Colorado, and in the Columbia/Snake system 
triggered conflict resolution efforts in those basins.  And, of course, it was the operation 
of newly-released Biological Opinions in the Klamath Basin, when combined with the 
worst drought in a century, that led to headline-grabbing conflict in that watershed. 
 
 Although there was no specific triggering event that initiated the Trinity River 
restoration effort it, too, was motivated by environmental concerns, and the broadly-
recognized need to address a degraded watershed.  The Lower Colorado allocation issues 
among the basin states stand alone as a major water dispute that had neither a strong 
triggering event, nor an obvious environmental bent.  As discussed further below, it 
represents an unusual case in which strong federal and state leadership anticipated a 
serious water conflict and took action to address it before reaching a crisis stage. 
 
 
 B.  Significant Public Interest 
 
 Big problems typically require big solutions which, in turn, typically require the 
expenditure of significant political capital and dollars, as discussed below.   Interestingly, 
strong public interest in a water dispute often is a necessary ingredient in forging a “big” 
solution, precisely because political leaders cannot – or will not – muscle a solution 
through the thicket of competing interests, and through the legislative and budgetary 
process, in the absence of demonstrated public interest in the issue. 
 
 Historically, water disputes do not captivate the interest of the general public.  
Water conflicts often appear to affect only narrow interest groups.  They also can be 
highly technical, and can seem somewhat abstract, insofar as the general public’s access 
to adequate water supplies rarely appears to be at issue. 
 
 Nearly all of the conflicts reviewed above, however, share a common 
characteristic in that they have captured the public interest during important phases of 
their development and/or resolution.  Interestingly, the evolution of water disputes into 
environmental-oriented conflicts  has played a major role in garnering public interest in 




appeal because the Everglades National Park is a nationally-recognized environmental 
resource.  Likewise, salmon-related conflicts on the Columbia and Snake River systems 
have captured significant public interest, in part because  salmon are strongly-valued, 
publicly-recognized resources in the Pacific Northwest.  And both local and national 
interest has been strong in the well-publicized troubles in the Klamath basin, particularly 
in light of the economic suffering of the farming community and the conflicting interests 
of tribes and fishermen.  
 
 In other cases reviewed above, public interest has been less sustained.  In the Bay 
Delta, the well-publicized conflicts in the early 1990s provided the public support and 
pressure needed to help strike the Bay Delta Accord in 1994.  Once a long-term 
stakeholder effort was launched and financial and scientific resources were invested in 
the effort, however, the Bay Delta conflict no longer became “news” and the general 
public assumed that the Accord’s temporary peace would continue indefinitely.  Also, 
because the environmental resource of the Bay Delta is not as well understood by the 
general public (in contrast to the Everglades), on-going interest in the Bay Delta dispute 
has waned. 
 
 The lack of continuing public interest in the Bay Delta matter may explain why 
California leaders are having difficulty in converting the successful dispute resolution 
effort into a permanent reality through the passage of an omnibus authorization for the 
CAL-FED program.  Without an expression of significant public interest in the issue in 
California – and, preferably, throughout the nation (again, as in the case of the 
Everglades) – leaders face a formidable challenge in sustaining the momentum needed to 
nail down a solution to this complex, long-standing set of water conflicts. 
 
 Focused and episodic public interest in a water conflict sometimes is enough to 
satisfy this ingredient to water conflict resolutions.  In the early 1980s, concern about the 
impacts of Glen Canyon Dam flows on Grand Canyon beaches galvanized public interest 
in the issue, and prompted early attention of the issue.  Likewise, in the Upper Colorado, 
species listings in the late 1980s were big news in the region.  Because potential negative 
impacts on water projects are newsworthy developments in Utah, Wyoming and 
Colorado (in contrast to California and many other jurisdictions), public interest in the 
issue was high, and the stage was set for addressing the issue proactively.  Likewise, local 
interest always has been strong in restoration of the Trinity River basin in northern 
California, primarily because Trinity County is one of the poorest in the state, and the 




  C.  Personal Attention By Key Leaders 
 
 A common characteristic that runs through virtually all successfully-addressed 




have a heavy federal and state component, such as those discussed above, leadership by 
top agency officials typically is required.  A personal commitment is needed by top 
officials because the difficult problems presented by large disputes, and the strong 
competing interests presented in such matters (including within governmental 
subagencies that have different, and sometimes conflicting, missions), typically can only 
be addressed if the full authority and stature of the government and its leaders are brought 
to bear on the conflict. 
  
 When really tough issues are presented, active involvement by top officials needs 
to be hands-on; window-dressing will not suffice.  The personal leadership of Secretary 
Babbitt and EPA Administrator Browner in the Everglades and Bay Delta disputes 
illustrates the point.  In both cases, these cabinet-level officials participated actively in 
stakeholder meetings, strategy sessions, Congressional briefings, and media events.  They 
were joined by top political representatives, on a bipartisan basis including, among many 
others, Senator Diane Feinstein, Congressman George Miller, Governors Pete Wilson and 
Gray Davis (in the case of the Bay Delta), and Senators Graham of Florida, Robert Smith 
of New Hampshire, Governors Lawton Chiles and Jeb Bush (in the case of the 
Everglades). 
 
 Likewise, on the Colorado, the sustained personal interest of the “water master” – 
the Secretary of the Interior, has been a key ingredient to resolution of the Glen Canyon 
Dam operations issues, the Upper Colorado species restoration plan and, more recently 
and most obviously, in the river-wide management issues that have arisen in light of the 
State of California’s over-reliance on Colorado River water supplies.  In the latter matter, 
Secretary Babbitt had the personal interest and experience in Colorado River matters to 
enable him to carefully push the right levers in a engaging in a sustained diplomatic 
mission to negotiate a solution with the active involvement of major water interests in the 
basin and their sometimes-prickly state representatives.  He was able to do so even in the 
absence of several of the other ingredients that usually are required before major water 
conflicts can be solved (viz., a strong triggering event; significant public interest). 
 
   Interestingly, the same type of high-level, sustained personal commitment by 
governmental officials has not been devoted to the Columbia and Snake River basins.  
Unlike the Colorado River, where the Secretary of the Interior is the obvious leader, the 
Columbia/Snake involves a gaggle of federal government agencies, with the lead 
regulatory role being played by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), a 
subagency in the Commerce Department.   NMFS officials do not have the stature and 
clout needed to forge a comprehensive solution to the basin’s problems, particularly 
when many other agencies have competing players and missions, including the Defense 
Department (the Army Corps of Engineers), the Energy Department (Bonneville Power 
Authority), the Interior Department (Fish & Wildlife Service; Bureau of Reclamation; 





 In the Klamath, high level attention is now being paid to the conflict after the 
issuance of new NMFS and FWS biological opinions, combined with a record-setting 
drought, forced the issue.  Although the Klamath Basin’s oversubscription problem had 
been incubating for decades, Klamath was treated, like many other disputes, as a low 
grade fever until a triggering event demanded attention.  As discussed below, Klamath 
also suffered from the absence of an effective forum to resolve basin-wide disputes due, 
in part, to the fragmentation of authority in the basin among federal, state and tribal 
organizations, as highlighted in the Oregon State analysis of the situation.  With a strong 
triggering event, and the subsequent personal engagement of Secretaries Norton and 
Veneman, the stage is set for addressing the long-standing conflict in Klamath, so long as 
the other necessary ingredients for success which are identified in this paper come into 
play.     
 
 
 D.  Close Federal/State Partnership 
 
 A consistent theme of successful resolution of major water rights conflicts is a 
close federal/state partnership.  Even in matters in which the federal government arguably 
is the major player due to its legal authority and budgetary commitment, active state 
support and involvement typically is needed to bring a solution across the finish line. 
 
 The Bay Delta and the Everglades again prove the point in dramatic fashion.  In 
both cases, the full authority of state government supported these major new water and 
environmental initiatives.  Both states contributed expert help, significant state funding, 
and strong political support.  Indeed, without strong state support, including the arm-
twisting of interested parties, neither initiative would have succeeded. 
 
 The same principle applies, in a less dramatic fashion, in the other disputes 
reviewed above.  On the Colorado River, strong state involvement by California and the 
other basin states was a key ingredient in enabling the Secretary of Interior to develop a 
plan to address California’s over-reliance on Colorado River water.  Although the 
Secretary is the “water master,” as a practical matter he or she must work in close 
cooperation with state officials in order achieve consensus solutions.  That is the history 
of problem-solving on the Colorado, and it serves as a model for disputes elsewhere. 
 
 In the Columbia Basin, a close federal/state partnership has not been evident, and 
the salmon conflicts arguably remain poorly addressed as a result.  In the Columbia, state 
officials have tended to call for state-led solutions, as exhibited by the passage of the 
state-oriented Northwest Power Planning and Conservation Act and, more recently, by 
the efforts of the four governors in the region to meet periodically and develop their own 
solution.  At the same time, the fragmented federal agencies gathered in the federal 
caucus and attempted to address their own competing interests and regulatory 
responsibilities.  In defense of both the state and federal efforts, the complexity of the 




overcome, but the fact remains that the failure to forge a strong federal/state partnership 
has been a continuing barrier to success in the region. 
 
 
 E.  Strong Science/Funding 
  
 Virtually all of the successful efforts to solve major water disputes have included 
a heavy dose of science.  Indeed, looking across the high-profile disputes that have 
dominated a number of watersheds in recent years, the role of science has become more 
and more important in helping to resolve (or, in a few cases, confound) water conflicts.   
 
 Tens of millions of dollars have been devoted to long-term science efforts in the 
Bay Delta, the Everglades, the Columbia, the Colorado (in connection with the Upper 
Colorado species recovery effort, and the Glen Canyon dam study effort) and the Trinity.  
In all of these cases, science has helped to frame the issues involved and has provided the 
foundation for restoration plans.  In most of these cases, formal science input has been 
solicited and received, with extensive use of outside scientific resources and peer review.  
The science has been woven into stakeholder group reviews (as discussed below), and 
made available for public review and comment, typically through the operation of the 
National Environmental Policy Act (via Environmental Impact Statements), and/or in the 
issuance of targeted reports. 
 
 It is difficult to understate the importance of science in helping to resolve the new 
generation of major water conflicts that are arising out of concerns that traditional 
management practices are damaging water quality and ecosystem health.  Scientific 
evaluations of how much water needs to be available, and under what conditions, to 
address ecosystem needs typically are central to resolving the conflict.  Creative, practical 
solutions are needed, and scientists often are in the best position to test the potential 
viability of alternative approaches. 
 
 The contrast between the science effort in the Trinity River basin, and the 
Klamath, highlights the importance of having strong, open science to support watershed 
decisionmaking.  In the case of the Trinity, a twenty year-long science effort, led by the 
well-respected United States Geological Survey, the Bureau of Reclamation and Fish & 
Wildlife Service, established a strong scientific base for long-term river restoration 
decisionmaking. The science effort on the Trinity was well-funded, open, and 
participatory. 
 
 In contrast, the Klamath Basin historically has not attracted significant scientific 
funding, and when a triggering crisis hit, the scientific groundwork for solving the water 
conflict had not been laid.  The potential role of groundwater supplies in the basin had 
not been carefully evaluated, and the science behind the Biological Opinions issues by 
NMFS and FWS had largely been developed by the agencies themselves, under the 




involvement of the National Research Council, additional scientific resources are being 
brought to bear, in the hope that the basin can benefit from the same type of scientific 
analysis that has helped define solutions for the Bay Delta, the Everglades, the Grand 
Canyon, and the Trinity River, among others.   
 
 The role of science in solving disputes is tied directly with the need for adequate 
funding to address difficult water conflicts.  As with the other factors identified in this 
paper, money is a consistent ingredient for – and often an indicator of – success.  Big 
problems often need big solutions and such solutions typically are expensive.  The $8 
billion dollar scope of both the Bay Delta and the Everglades restoration effort is 
breathtaking.  To help put it into context, the entire budget for the original, nationwide 
Superfund cleanup program was $8.5 billion dollars. 
 
 Just as funding has been a key ingredient in the Bay Delta and Everglades 
matters, long-term, significant federal investments also have been made in all aspects of 
the Colorado River disputes, in the Columbia/Snake basin (as illustrated by the $400 
million in annual investments by the Bonneville Power Authority), and in the Trinity 
River.  In each case, funds have been used to support scientific evaluation, to fund 
specific restoration pilot projects and, later, to implement more broad-based restoration 
programs, and to support federal, state, tribal, and local participation in the complex, 
participatory processes needed to generate solution paths in these difficult disputes. 
 
 
 F.  Meaningful Stakeholder Involvement 
 
 One of the most remarkable, consistent themes of successful conflict resolution 
efforts in high-profile water disputes is the development and use of meaningful 
stakeholder forums to scope issues, air complaints, work through problems, identify and 
test solutions and, ultimately, to develop the range of constituencies needed to support 
new watershed approaches.  The major water disputes discussed in this paper provide 
excellent examples of “lessons learned” when it comes to stakeholder involvement.1 
 
 In the case of the Bay Delta and the Everglades, for example, ad hoc stakeholder 
groups later developed into more formal convening bodies that brought together the full 
range of interested parties, including federal, state and local decisionmakers, water user 
interests, environmentalists, tribal representatives, and representatives of the business 
community.  Just as importantly, these stakeholders were brought together to solve a 
specific problem that needed to be addressed due to the presence of the other important 
ingredients discussed in this paper, including a strong triggering event, significant public 
interest, etc.  As such, the effort was directed, and targeted;  meetings were not held for 
                                               
1  There are many other good examples as well including, notably, the participatory stakeholder 




the sake of holding meetings.  Decisions needed to be made.  Important constituencies 
needed to be on board. 
 
 Less ambitious, but equally important, stakeholder groups have played a key role 
in addressing Glen Canyon Dam operational issues, the Upper Colorado restoration plan, 
and the Trinity River restoration effort.  In all cases, formal groups have been put in place 
and are participating, on an on-going basis, in key decisionmaking in the watersheds. 
 
 The Columbia/Snake Basin provides an interesting contrast to the successful 
stakeholder efforts described above.  In the Columbia, there has been no shortage of 
attempts to convene stakeholder groups.  Indeed, as explained above, the landscape 
seems to be littered with stakeholder forums.  Interested parties in the Pacific Northwest 
can spend years – even careers – attending meeting after meeting after meeting. 
 
 The missing ingredient in the Columbia watershed has been the close connection 
between stakeholder groups and actual decisionmaking in the basin.   The 
decisionmaking undertaken by NMFS, Bonneville, the Corps and other key actors has 
proceeded largely through customary processes at the affected agencies.  Input was 
received from the public, but the type of disciplined vetting of alternatives with closely-
involved stakeholders, which characterized the Bay Delta, Everglades, and Colorado 
River efforts, has been missing.  Indeed, the Colombia Basin may be suffering from too 
many stakeholder efforts, diluting the importance of the input and the linkage with actual 
decisionmaking. 
 
 Part of the Klamath’s difficulties also stem from the absence of a meaningful 
stakeholder forum that brings together the geographically divided communities of interest 
in the basin.  Until the triggering events of 2001 occurred, there was no obvious forum 
(such as the preparation of a programmatic Environmental Impact Statement or a focused 
science effort) around which a broad-based stakeholder group might coalesce.  Also, the 
fragmented character of the basin – with an Oregon-led water rights adjudication 
proceeding alongside regulatory decisionmaking conducted separately by NMFS and 
FWS, and a largely self-contained Bureau of Reclamation annual decisionmaking process 








4.  Conclusion 
 
 A new generation of water conflicts has been emerging in the United States and, 
with it, we are developing a new experience base for addressing and resolving difficult 
and complex water conflicts.  This paper has reviewed major water disputes that have 
arisen in recent years in five major watersheds, and has analyzed common elements of 
conflict resolution success – and failure – in this difficult arena. 
 
 The results of this analysis are striking.  Based on the experience base reviewed in 
this paper, one can predict the outcome of serious water conflicts that involve significant 
federal interests by examining the presence of six specific factors – a strong triggering 
event; significant public interest; personal attention by key leaders; close federal/state 
partnership; strong science and funding; and meaningful stakeholder involvement.  If any 
of these elements are missing, it is rare that difficult water problems will be solved in any 
meaningful way.   The attached chart illustrates the phenomenon.   
 
 The challenge for all of us who are interested in these issues is to push out the 
base of experience further, and share the results of these experiences, so that the 
observations made and tested in this paper can undergo additional evaluation and 
refinement – all for the purpose of enhancing our collective ability to find way to develop 
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